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“[The] genius of our Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with the problems
of a developing America. A principle to be vital must be of wider application than the
mischief that gave it birth. Constitutions are not ephemeral documents, designed to meet
passing occasions. The future is in their care, and therefore, in their application, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.”
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 495 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

In the wake of the California energy crisis of 2000-2001, the California Energy Commission
(CEC) and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) began to pursue “demand response”
energy programs in order to reduce peak energy demand. Demand response systems use pricing
schemes such as tiered pricing or critical-peak pricing to influence customers to exert choice
regarding when they use electricity, in the process reducing energy usage and shifting usage to nonpeak hours.1 Armed with information about the time-varying cost of electricity, residential and
∗
 2008, Jack I. Lerner, Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Acting Director of the USC Intellectual Property
and Technology Law Clinic at USC Gould School of Law and Non-Resident Clinic Fellow, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public
Policy Clinic, University of California—Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall)
∗∗
 2008, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Clinical Professor of Law, Director, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic,
Director, Center for Clinical Education, University of California—Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). The authors wish to thank:
Gaymond Yee, Ron Hoffman, P.A. Subrahmanyam, David Wagner, Umesh Shankar, Erin Jones, Paul K. Wright, Nathan Ota,
Steve Wicker, Arthur Rosenfeld, Kristy Chew, and the individuals from Charles River Associates International, Cornell Law
School, eMeter Corporation, Levy Associates, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Southern
California Edison, the United States Department of Justice, and Utility Integration Solutions, Inc. who greatly assisted the authors
in preparation of a report prepared for the Network Security Architecture for Demand Response/Sensor Networks project of the
California Institute for Energy and Environment, see infra note 1; and Jennifer Granick, Matthew Lamberti, Maryanne McCormick,
Robert Weisberg, Jeremy Brown, Jeremy Price, and the participants of the “Beyond a Physical Conception of the 4th Amendment:
Search & Seizure in the Digital Age” Symposium at Stanford Law School.
1 P.A. SUBRAHMANYAM, DAVID WAGNER, DEIRDRE MULLIGAN, ERIN JONES, UMESH SHANKAR & JACK LERNER,
NETWORK SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR DEMAND RESPONSE/SENSOR NETWORKS 14 (2005, rev. 2006), available at
http://www.ucop.edu/ciee/dretd/ (follow “Draft Final Report (pdf)” hyperlink) (report for the Network Security Architecture for
Demand Response/Sensor Networks project, CIEE Award No. DR-04-03A, B, WA No. DR-005, under CEC/CII Prime
Contract No. 300-01-043, conducted by CyberKnowledge and the University of California at Berkeley) [hereinafter NETWORK
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE].

Copyright © 2008 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099121

¶2

¶3

¶4

commercial customers are expected to reduce energy usage and/or shift their usage to non-peak, less
costly hours. Such shifts, even if they do not create reductions in overall consumption, are expected
to reduce the likelihood of energy brownouts and blackouts and provide direct savings to
consumers.2 Technologies to enable the demand response system, including advanced metering and
in-home sensor and control technologies,3 are now under development, and advanced meters are
now being installed in the homes of Pacific Gas & Electric customers throughout Northern
California.4
The collection of information about energy consumption from residential and commercial
buildings at frequent intervals is a core component of the demand response system. The analog
electric meters prevalent today are unsophisticated instruments that allow a meter reader to assess
electricity use during the time interval between meter readings. The meters found in basements and
on exterior walls are typically read once a month, or less frequently. Over the next two to five years,
however, these meters will be replaced by digital meters that collect data at frequent intervals, store it
for many days, and transmit it wirelessly to the utility.
Current utility practices include saving many years’ worth of customer usage data to facilitate
customer dispute resolution as well as load and other research. These data retention practices are
expected to persist.5 If all the data generated by demand response systems is retained, a customer’s
monthly record will shift from a record of one data point reflecting average monthly usage to a
record of 750 to 3,000 distinct and time-stamped data points per month that reflect actual energy use.
The information itself is distinct from the averages found in today’s bills, but more significantly, the
information one can glean or infer from this more accurate and detailed data set is radically different.
Electricity consumption patterns in the coming demand response system will reveal variations in
power consumption that, in turn, can be associated with various household activities. Over time,
power consumption information can reveal personal sleep and work habits, the presence of certain
medical equipment and other specialized devices, and, of course, signal the illegal behavior which
today prompts law enforcement to seek it in certain drug production cases.
The changes in the frequency, format, contents, storage, and transmission of data about
electricity consumption that are integral to the planned demand response infrastructure raise
interesting questions about the ongoing viability of maintaining, as a technical, practical, and legal
matter, the privacy of activities occurring within the home. How will the system architecture and
business models address the increased sensitivity of meter readings? For example, imagine if future
“wardrivers”6 detect and monitor the unencrypted traffic between household meters and
neighborhood-level concentrators that relay energy usage information to the utilities. If a criminal
were to monitor such communications to obtain information about occupancy on a per house, block,
or neighborhood level, he or she could relatively easily assess the best time to burglarize homes or
engage in other property crimes in a neighborhood.7 How will the business models of utilities evolve
2 David Cay Johnston, Taking Control of Electric Bill, Hour by Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, at A14, available at
http://www.sfpower.org/pdf/nyt_energy_use_article.pdf (discussing savings of participants in a Chicago demand response pilot
and Central Park New York City co-op that earned $3,000 selling unused energy capacity back to the utilities during a blackout in
July 2006).
3 See, e.g., Scott Neumann et al., The Missing Link, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, March 2007, at 52, available at
http://www.ucop.edu/ciee/dretd/documents/Fortnightly%20Article%20Mar%2007.pdf.
4 See NETWORK SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, supra note 1, at 22. These technologies will be coupled with a communication
and network infrastructure that supports the multicast of real-time pricing information, and the aggregation of energy usage and
billing information. It is intended that the associated infrastructure support other operations, such as diagnosis and maintenance,
but a discussion of such operations is beyond the scope of this paper. Id. at note a.
5 See infra Part III.
6 “Wardriving is the act of moving around a specific area and mapping the population of wireless access points for statistical
purposes. These statistics are then used to raise awareness of the security problems associated with these types of networks
(typically wireless).” JEFF MOSS, WARDRIVING: DRIVE, DETECT, DEFEND: A GUIDE TO WIRELESS SECURITY 3 (2004).
7 Crime-fighting organizations often advise individuals not to put a vacation stop on their newspaper because the
centralization of such information about multiple households with the newspaper creates an attractive data pool to would-be
thieves. Similarly, the ability to monitor energy consumption data as it feeds into the neighborhood concentrator provides an
attractive place for thieves to gather information on multiple households at once and requires less resources than staking out
individual houses or neighborhoods to visually assess the daily patterns of residents. Cf. Chronicle Staff Report, Chronicle subscriber

Copyright © 2008 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099121

¶5

¶6

¶7

¶8

to take advantage of the more detailed information that can be gleaned from energy consumption
data taken at fifteen-minute intervals? Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, how will the
increased information about in-home activities generated, transmitted, and stored in demand
response systems be dealt with under the Fourth Amendment?
Existing legal precedents addressing the privacy of in-home activities, the energy they require,
and the heat signatures they emit, point in different directions. On the one hand, in 2001 the
Supreme Court affirmed the primacy of privacy in the home by prohibiting the use of a thermal
imager to gather details about the home that would have been previously inaccessible without a
physical trespass—at least until such time as the technology to do so becomes widely available to the
general public.8 This decision built upon previous judgments in which the Court maintained robust
Fourth Amendment protections for the home based on the quality or quantity of the data that can be
known.9 On the other hand, firmly entrenched federal jurisprudence provides that where the
government obtains personal details from third-party business records, the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated.10 Essentially, while eschewing an examination of the quality and quantity of
information that devices reveal about the inside of the home, the Supreme Court has allowed the
location of that information—in business records—to be completely determinative of the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, financial information in the home cannot be seized without a
warrant, but the same financial information—revealing political contributions, memberships,
purchasing patterns, and personal and business relationships—held in bank records are completely
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, the Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates
continued respect for the sanctity of the home and for the expectation of privacy that attaches to
activities taking place inside the physical boundaries of the home.
Under the Court’s jurisprudence, it is plausible that information about energy consumption
inside the home contained in the records of a public utility—regardless of how sophisticated and
detailed it becomes or how much it can reveal about the residents—could be found to be
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. Meanwhile, the use of a relatively unsophisticated “device”
that enhances law enforcement officers’ senses, allowing them to retrieve far less detailed
information about in-home energy consumption, will require a warrant (at least until these devices
become widely available to the public).
This article considers the Fourth Amendment issues raised by the changes in the quantity and
quality of the data that soon will be routinely available in utility records in California and eventually
across the nation.11 We begin our exploration of these questions in Part II by exploring the Court’s
Fourth Amendment analysis of law enforcement officers’ use of technologies that directly enhance
their senses. We compare and contrast this with the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis
and state courts’ analysis of comparable state constitutional privacy protections in the context of
business records that yield information similar to that available through technological devices. We
consider the Kyllo, Smith, and Miller cases, among others, and state constitutional decisions
considering the privacy expectations with respect to utility records.
The comparisons highlight the inability of the Supreme Court’s current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to provide a rational and satisfying description of the privacy interests the Constitution
protects in a world of networks, devices, and personal services that by design collect and retain
vacation information allegedly stolen, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 10, 2007, at B3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/11/10/BA4ET9PGL.DTL.
8 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (discussed infra Part II).
9 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (prohibiting government use of a beeper to determine without warrant
whether a particular article or person is in a home at a particular time); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327-28 (1987) (holding that
moving stereo equipment in order to locate serial numbers constituted search and had to be supported by probable cause).
10 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (see infra Part II); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (see infra Part II).
11 This article builds upon an ongoing collaborative effort at the University of California at Berkeley to study the security and
privacy consequences of the overall demand response system, and work with policymakers, technologists, and industry to identify
and implement technical, policy, and practices that can address them. In particular, this article relies on information gathered for
NETWORK SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, supra note 1.
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personal information on private acts. They also illustrate the flimsy protection likely found in Kyllo’s
narrow limitation on “government-only” technology.
As the information in utility records becomes more detailed, the Court’s disparate analysis of
these two techniques for collecting information about activities taking place in the home leads to
increasingly unsatisfying results from a normative perspective. The continued conclusion that
personal information contained in third party business records is outside the Fourth Amendment is
poised to obliterate what the Supreme Court has identified as the “firm line [the Fourth Amendment
draws] at the entrance to the house.”12 We provide details of the likely demand response architecture
in Part III.
In Part IV, we explore the ramifications of the business records case law in this context, and
argue that the economics of information processing are changing in a manner that is shifting the
scope and effect of the Court’s business records doctrine. The evolution of the demand response
architecture provides a particularly stark example of the capacity of the business records case law to
erode the core of Fourth Amendment protections, but it should be viewed in the context of a larger
societal shift towards a heavily networked existence. In light of our growing cultural dependence on
private sector services that generate records containing personal information about activities
occurring within the home, by placing personal information contained in business records outside
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has effectively consigned us to a
future without privacy. We therefore propose that the Court adopt a Kyllo-like test that asks whether
the technology reveals information that otherwise would not be available absent a trespass into the
home into its consideration of business records. In that decision, Justice Scalia, writing for five
members of the Court, advocated taking “a long view” on the Fourth Amendment,13 examining the
future potential to intrude on the home rather than the limited heat pattern revealed by the thermal
imager at issue.14 It is time for the Court to take a “long view” on the capacity of business records to
intrude on reasonable expectations of privacy in the home.
II. INFORMATION ABOUT ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION: BUSINESS RECORD OR
“VIRTUAL CURRENT BIOGRAPHY”?

¶11

¶12

The issue of whether the Fourth Amendment protects information about the in-home use of
electricity has arisen in two distinct contexts: access to residential records held by utilities and police
use of thermal imaging devices to detect heat loss of a residence. In drug investigations, police use
both techniques to identify abnormal energy consumption patterns that may indicate in-home
marijuana production.
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, these two methods of obtaining information about inhome energy consumption could result in very different outcomes under the Fourth Amendment.
Based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding third-party business records, the first,
accessing utility records, would likely not be found to violate the reasonable expectation of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment.15 The latter, use of a thermal imaging device, has been held by
the Court to invade the reasonable expectation of privacy the Fourth Amendment protects and
therefore to require a warrant prior to police use.16 The disparity in Fourth Amendment protection
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 103, 106.
14 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 103.
15 While the Court has not ruled on utility records directly, it has found no Fourth Amendment interest in a range of records
that reveal information about individuals. See infra Part II. Several state courts have decided that utility records fall outside the
privacy protection afforded by state constitutional equivalents of the Fourth Amendment based largely on the federal business
records doctrine. In an earlier article, one of the authors argues against an expansive reading of the business records case law,
concluding that the cases limited Fourth Amendment protection only where the business has an independent interest in the
records, the records are disclosed to the business for its use, and the substance of the record is not expressive. See Deirdre K.
Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004).
16 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
12
13
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hinges largely on a line of 1970s cases finding that individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in business records containing their personal information.17
State case law finding utility records to be outside the protection afforded by state constitutional
equivalents of the Fourth Amendment can be divided into two categories. The bulk of state courts
that have ruled on the issue have interpreted state law privacy provisions in a manner consistent with
the Supreme Court’s business records reasoning, holding that the records voluntarily disclosed to the
utilities are afforded no protection. A small number of state courts have found that the records are
protected under state constitutional provisions, but have nevertheless found lower levels of
procedural protection sufficient upon concluding that only limited privacy interests were at stake.
A. Kyllo v. United States

¶14

¶15

¶16

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution both provide
protections against unreasonable government intrusions into the home.18 Supreme Court
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment has long held that activities within the four walls of the
home, even illicit activities, warrant special protection from intrusion by law enforcement. In 2001,
the United States Supreme Court decided in Kyllo v. United States that law enforcement agents may not
use sense-enhancing technology that is capable of revealing both illegal and legal activity that is not
readily available to the public to reveal activity within the home, regardless of whether the
information discovered is incriminating.19 It is a decision that exemplifies the high level of privacy
and freedom from surveillance that people can reasonably expect in their homes.
In 1992, federal agents, suspecting that marijuana was being grown in Danny Kyllo’s Florence,
Oregon triplex, used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the property for infrared
radiation created by high-intensity lamps.20 The imager “converts radiation into images based on
relative warmth—black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences.”21 The scan
showed patches of relative heat on a side wall and the roof over the garage. Based on this
information and other evidence such as tips from informants and utility bills, a federal magistrate
judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of Kyllo’s home; in the subsequent search, federal agents
found over 100 plants. Kyllo challenged the warrant. On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district
court found that the Agema is a “non-intrusive device which . . . shows a crude visual image of the
heat being radiated from the outside of the house” that did not reveal people, activities, or
conversations inside the home and upheld the warrant. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority, declared that while visual
surveillance had always been lawful, “[t]he present case involves officers on a public street engaged in
more than naked-eye surveillance of a home . . . . The question we confront today is what limits there
are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”22 The Supreme Court
focused its analysis of that question on two details of the sense-enhancing technology employed.
First, the Court asked, was the technology in common use at the time, such that residents of the
house might have expected the technology to be used against them? The thermal-imaging device in
this case was uncommon and not publicly available, so the surveillance was improper without a
warrant. Second, would the information gathered be otherwise accessible without entering the home?
The information gained by the imaging device in this case would not otherwise be available from
outside, and so again, the surveillance was improper.23
See infra Part II.B.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
19 Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
20 Id. at 29.
21 Id. at 29-30.
22 Id. at 33-34.
23 Id. at 34-40.
17
18
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In Kyllo, the Court rejected the notion that there is a difference between “off-the-wall”
surveillance and “through-the-wall” surveillance in light of the steady advance of technology. To
draw such a distinction without regard to the power of the technology “would leave the homeowner
at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human
activity in the home.”24 Besides, noted the Court, “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes,”25 and in any
event, thermal-imaging might disclose “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily
sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider ‘intimate’ . . . .”26 As a result, “we must take the
long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.”27
It is useful to think about privacy in a demand response setting by considering the two key
questions from Kyllo. First, will new technologies that make information on in-home activity available
to other persons outside the home—information such as occupancy, movement, or any other
behavior that otherwise would not be visible from outside—cross the line set by the Supreme Court
and violate a person’s rightful expectation of privacy inside his home? It is possible that by mining
energy data in a relatively straightforward way, one might be able to discover enough about in-home
behavior to cross this line. Second, might the test set forth in Kyllo, in which the expectation of
privacy is dynamic—tied to the novelty of the technology used to invade it—mean that the
expectation of privacy could be eroded over time, as demand response technologies become
commonplace?28 We think not. Kyllo soundly reaffirmed the sanctity of the home and the Court’s
view that an expectation of privacy in activities taking place inside the home is presumptively
reasonable. Thus, courts should “take the long view on the Fourth Amendment” and maintain this
presumption despite the fact that technology may become increasingly invasive.
B. Federal Business Records Jurisprudence29

¶19

¶20

¶21

The Supreme Court has not ruled on utility records directly, but it has held that no Fourth
Amendment interest exists in a range of records kept by third parties that reveal information about
individuals.
In Couch v. United States,30 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to records
that a business had voluntarily provided to an independently employed accountant.31 The Court
reasoned that business owners cannot legitimately expect the records they give to outside
accountants—with whom there is no recognized confidential privilege—to be private.32
The business records doctrine was further developed in United States v. Miller.33 In that case, a
defendant in a criminal trial had moved to suppress copies of financial records that federal agents had
obtained from a bank.34 The Court held that under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, such documents
were not private papers but rather business records belonging to the bank.35 The Court did not rule
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 37.
26 Id. at 38.
27 Id. at 40.
28 Other commentators have discussed the dynamism and circularity of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g.,
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case For Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808
(2004); Susan Friewald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 39 & n.205 (2004).
29 Congress has enacted statutory protections of electronic communications and other information held by third parties, most
notably in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in various
sections of 18 U.S.C.). This statute provides some protection, although the protection can be uneven. See generally Mulligan, supra
note 15. A discussion of federal and state statutory protections and their applicability to information held by third parties is outside
the scope of this article.
30 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
31 Id. at 325, 336.
32 Id. at 335-36.
33 Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
34 Id. at 436-37.
35 Id. at 440-41.
24
25
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on any other types of records, but noted that it would have to “examine the nature of particular
documents . . . in order to determine whether there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning
their contents.”36
Finally, in Smith v. Maryland,37 the Court held that law enforcement officers did not need a
warrant, or even a court order, to ask a telephone company to monitor the numbers a particular
customer dialed.38 The Court concluded that telephone users could not reasonably expect the
numbers they dial to be private because, through the act of dialing, they voluntarily shared the
numbers they were dialing with the telephone company.39
Although the business records doctrine has been widely criticized,40 it is firmly established, and
the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied it to new types of information held by third parties,
including utility records information.41 In the 1992 case United States v. Starkweather,42 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Supreme Court jurisprudence on thirdparty information to electric utility records. Citing Smith and Miller, the court noted that it had
previously rejected the argument that telephone company billing records are protected by the Fourth
Amendment, since the “public awareness that such records are routinely maintained . . . negate[s] any
constitutionally sufficient expectation of privacy regarding the records.”43 Without further discussion,
the court concluded, “[w]e see no principled reason to accord electric utility records any different
status under the Fourth Amendment than that accorded bank or telephone records.”44 Similarly, in
United States v. Hamilton, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that no
warrant was required to obtain power consumption records for the defendant’s home.45 Relying on
Smith v. Maryland, the court distinguished utility records from the thermal imaging device at issue in
Kyllo. “[W]hen Mr. Hamilton used power in his home,” the court reasoned, “he voluntarily conveyed
that information to PGE, his electric company. As a result, he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his power records.”46
It is useful to examine why the Court in Kyllo did not find an abandonment rationale persuasive.
The Court could have concluded, as Justice Stevens urged in his dissenting opinion, that Kyllo had
abandoned the heat radiating from his house in the same way that the defendants in California v.
Greenwood47 abandoned their garbage.48 The animating concepts behind the business records doctrine
are abandonment, voluntary disclosure, and assumption of risk. These seem like a good fit for the
“waste heat” which is freely available for anyone with the right technology to “see” from a public
vantage point when compared to utility records which are a necessary derivative of heating or
powering a home and are provided solely to the utility for the purpose of that service. We think the
Court did not adopt this rationale in part because heat or radiation emanating from a home is not
released voluntarily, and more importantly because this technology can be used to observe activities
taking place inside the home.49 In short, by taking a “long view” on the Fourth Amendment, the
Id. at 442.
Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
38 Id. at 745-46.
39 Id. at 743-44.
40 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7(c), at 511-17 (2d ed. 1987); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All
Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 373 n.7 (2006).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (unpublished disposition)
(internet service provider information).
42 United States v. Starkweather, No. 91-30354, 1992 WL 204005 (9th Cir. 1992) (table) (unpublished disposition).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (D. Or. 2006).
46 Id.
47 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
48 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49 Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 700 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13 (1948) for the proposition that “[O]dors alone do not authorize a search without warrant”).
36
37
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Court reaffirmed the sanctity of the home and the expectation of privacy regarding activities in the
home.50
C. Federal Business Records Under State Constitutional Law
¶25

¶26

A plurality of states that have addressed business records in the context of their state
constitutional law have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and held that such records fall outside the
privacy protection afforded by state constitutional equivalents of the Fourth Amendment. This
jurisprudence is based for the most part on the business records doctrine set forth in Smith and
Miller.51 For example, in 1993 the Supreme Court of Kansas adopted the rationale of Miller in holding
that Kansas citizens have no right to privacy in their bank records under § 15 of the Bill of Rights to
the Kansas Constitution.52
Other states reject the third-party doctrine in certain instances. California is the most notable of
these; in Burrows v. Superior Court,53 the California Supreme Court found a reasonable expectation of
privacy in bank records. Brennan based his dissent in Miller on Justice Mosk’s reasoning in Burrows: 54
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial
affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic
life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account. In the course of such
dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and
associations. Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography.55

¶27

¶28

A small number of states have found that business records are protected under state
constitutional provisions, but also concluded that only a limited privacy interest is at stake and, as a
result, have found lower levels of procedural protection sufficient.56
Still other states diverge from the federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but have not
repudiated the third-party doctrine, and some of these have held that no constitutional protection
exists for utility records. For example, Alaska’s constitution has a privacy amendment,57 but in 1996
the Court of Appeals of Alaska decided that “utility records . . . do not constitute information in
which society is prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.”58 It is worth noting,
however, that this opinion and similar opinions in other states base their holdings on the coarse
nature of the discoverable data and the fact that such data cannot identify any activities taking place
50 Several commentators have noted the continuing importance of physical location in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Melissa Arbus, A Legal U-Turn: The Rehnquist Court Changes Direction and Steers Back to the Privacy Norms of the Warren Era, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1729, 1735-43 (2003) (discussing importance of private property and trespass doctrine in post-Katz cases despite the
Court's rejection of the primacy of trespass analysis in Katz); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV.
119, 125-32 (2004) (identifying principles that dominate public discourse and judicial decisions about privacy, including curtailing
intrusions into places deemed private or personal).
51 See generally Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States, supra note 40 (surveying state law jurisprudence on third party business
records); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us
Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). Henderson’s research indicates that eighteen states have not diverged from the
substantive Fourth Amendment, eleven states have rejected the federal third-party doctrine, eleven states might reject the federal
third party doctrine, and ten states sometimes diverge from the Fourth Amendment but have given no reason to believe that they
will reject the federal third-party doctrine. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States, supra note 40, at 395.
52 State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1993).
53 Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).
54 California courts have also held that consumers do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in some records held by
telecommunications public utilities. See People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62 (Cal. 1984) (holding that a customer who paid to keep her
name, phone number, and address unlisted in telephone directories had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that data, and so a
warrant was required to obtain that data from the telephone company); see also In re Pacific Bell, 44 C.P.U.C.2d 694 (Cal. Publ. Util.
Comm’n 1992).
55 Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596.
56 See, e.g., In re Maxfield, 945 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1997); State v. Maxwell, 791 P.2d 223 (Wash. 1990); In re Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353
(Wash. 1986), superseded by statute, Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1987, ch. 403, 1987 Wash. Laws, § 1, 1546
(recodified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.56.050 (West 2007)).
57 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature
shall implement this section.”).
58 Samson v. Alaska, 919 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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inside the home. Thus, reasoned the Alaska court, the billing data does not require a warrant because
it “do[es] not identify any activities” of the suspect, nor does it “provide any intimate details of [the
suspect’s] life, identify his friends or political and business associates, nor does it provide or complete
a ‘virtual current biography.’ The power records, unlike telephone or bank records, do not reveal
discrete information about [the suspect’s] activities.”59
Like the Alaska court, both state and federal courts have repeatedly cited the coarse nature of
electricity usage data as justification for holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
power consumption information. For example, in a case where police used data collected from a
specially installed surveillance electricity meter to obtain a search warrant to look for marijuana
plants, the California Court of Appeal reasoned that because the metering information does not
reveal information about activities within the home, there is no constitutional protection:
The surveillance meter neither measures nor reveals anything about the intimate details of
activities within the house. The technology employed does not tell those monitoring it what
electrical devices are inside the house or what activities the power supports. The meter does
not discriminate between electricity used to fire pottery and power used to grow orchids,
tomatoes or marijuana. It only tells officers how much electricity is being delivered by the
utility and, by comparison to billing records, whether it is being diverted or stolen.60

¶30

Similar conclusions denying reasonable expectations of privacy in utility records based on how
little the data reveals have been drawn in other state and federal courts.61 This reasoning suggests that
metering information that discloses fine-grained usage information may be more likely to be held to
fall within a reasonable expectation of privacy than traditional monthly collection of aggregate utility
data.
III. DEMAND RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION
A. Utility Records in the Era Before Demand Response

¶31

¶32

Energy bills differ from one provider to another, but until recently, they all contained relatively
coarse readings of energy consumption. For example, a bill from San Diego Gas and Electric
provides information about average daily consumption of kilowatts during the billing period, overall
usage data, and comparative information about energy use the preceding month and the same month
in the last calendar year.62 The information available in utility bills is retrospective and does not reveal
daily patterns of energy consumption, nor does it reveal information about where within the home
energy is used or the purpose for which the energy is used. Importantly, it is difficult to infer
information about activities taking place within the home from the data available. For example,
greater than normal energy consumption can be due to excessive (as compared to average) laundry
washing patterns, halide lighting, or another source.63 The records at the energy company would not
provide insight into which activity was draining the power.
Infrared sensing devices are used by law enforcement to detect heat loss from a residence.
Information derived from the use of thermal imagers is used to support an application for a warrant
to search the home. The infrared sensing devices detect relative patterns of heat, allowing law
enforcement to compare the heat emanating from various parts of a residence and to compare the
heat patterns of neighboring homes to the residence at issue. A large amount of heat loss is typical of
the halide lights common in indoor marijuana-growing operations.
Id. at 173 (quoting State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)).
People v. Stanley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
61 See People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1994); Kluss, 867 P.2d 247. See also United States v. Delgado, 121 F. Supp.
2d 631 (E.D. Mich. 2000); United States v. Boger, 755 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wash. 1990).
62
See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Understanding Your Gas And Electric Bill,
http://www.sdge.com/customer/aboutyourbill.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (follow “Sample SDG&E Bill” hyperlink).
63 Kluss, 867 P.2d at 254 (“High power usage may be caused by any one of numerous factors: hot tubs, arc welders, poor
insulation, ceramic or pottery kilns, or indoor gardening under artificial lights.”).
59
60
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The most common use of energy records in a criminal case is to establish or confirm residency at
an address. Using the records as evidence that a residence is using extraordinary amounts of energy,
thus corroborating evidence of a home marijuana-growing operation, is the next most likely use, but
is relatively rare. Records may be sought at many stages of a case. Usage records may be sought early
in a marijuana home-growth case to support a tip or preliminary evidence, and build a case for a
search warrant. Records of usage and billing may alternatively be sought later, when more evidence is
in hand, to show that the person paying the energy bill must have had knowledge of the illegal
activity.64
In non-emergency situations, records are typically sought using a grand jury subpoena,65 as
utilities in California usually do not exercise their option to release customer data to law enforcement
voluntarily. It is also believed that subpoenaed records appear stronger in court, which encourages
law enforcement to use subpoenas. Obtaining a grand jury subpoena is simple—in some cases, it
takes as little as ten minutes. The records sought are typically copies of energy bills, records of
payment, and internal records identifying the subscriber.66
Current utility practices include saving many years’ worth of customer usage data to enable
customer disputes, and these data storage practices are expected to continue.67
B. Implementation of Demand Response and Advanced Metering

¶36

¶37

In response to the blackouts of 2000-2001, the California Public Utilities Commission and the
California Energy Commission commenced a joint rulemaking “to develop demand response as a
resource to enhance electric system reliability, reduce power purchase and individual consumer costs,
and protect the environment.”68 The term “demand response” refers to a means by which pricing
information or other signals are used to influence customers to exert choice regarding when they use
electricity, in the process reducing energy usage or shifting usage to non-peak hours.69 Various
technologies may be used to achieve these results, including advanced metering research and
development, in-home sensor and control technologies development, a robust communication
network that will use both wired and radio signals to transmit usage and other data, and the
aggregation of energy usage and billing information. In 2003-2004, a pricing pilot program in
California explored the feasibility of several time-varying rates, ways to communicate those rates, and
customers’ reactions to them.
California’s major investor-owned utilities have submitted various proposals to the CPUC for
extensive deployment of advanced meters and related infrastructure, as well as “dynamic pricing
tariffs.”70 Investor-owned utilities Pacific Gas & Electric and San Diego Gas & Electric have
requested permission to begin pre-deployment and deployment of advanced metering infrastructures,
and Southern California Edison has requested permission to develop an advanced integrated meter
64 The fact that a suspect pays the electric bill at an address may be used to infer that he has some knowledge or control of
events that take place at or contraband that is found in the residence.
65 Some agencies have their own administrative subpoena power and obtain records through a different process.
66 Although there is no clear rule prohibiting law enforcement from requesting customer data for a neighborhood or larger
area (and either sifting through it looking for a suspiciously high usage to target a suspect in a neighborhood where marijuana
growth is suspected, or using the neighborhood data to show that a suspect’s usage is high compared to neighbors’), in most cases
the only records requested are those of the suspect’s individual residence.
67 Data is typically stored for seven years. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 736; Utility Audit Co. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., Decision
98-09-061, Case 97-02-015, 1998 Cal. P.U.C. LEXIS 1097 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sept. 17, 1998). See also Network Security
Architecture at 38, supra note 1, at 87.
68 Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Decision 06-07-027, Application 05-06-028, 2006 Cal. P.U.C. LEXIS 274, at *3 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n July 20, 2006) (final opinion). See also California Energy Commission, Demand Response Proceeding Instituting
Rulemaking, http://energy.ca.gov/demandresponse/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007); California Public Utilities Commission,
Demand Response and Advanced Metering, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/hottopics/1energy/r0206001.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2007).
69 NETWORK SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, supra note 1, at 14.
70 Id. The pilot study was enacted in CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 393 (West 2007) (effective Jan. 1, 2001). For reports on the
study, see California Energy Commission, Documents Related to the Demand Response Proceeding,
http://energy.ca.gov/demandresponse/documents/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
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to support a future deployment.71 In July 2006, the CPUC authorized PG&E to spend (and bill
ratepayers) $1.7 billion to deploy advanced meters throughout its territory, which would involve
upgrading five million electric meters and four million gas meters over the following five years.72
These meters are expected to allow PG&E to “monitor its electrical load on an hourly basis,”
“conduct remote meter reading, pinpoint outages, [provide] remote turn off/turn on capability, . . .
[e]nable two-way communication to each customer’s meter[,] . . . [and] offer time varying rates to all
of its customers,” among other capabilities.73 The CPUC has also approved funding for SDG&E
pre-deployment activities.74
Advanced metering capabilities that are now being implemented will employ refurbished meters
having a data collection module with hourly readings and transmission of raw data to the utility.75
Later meters may contain more internal processing and data storage capability. The data set the meter
will send to the utility is expected to contain a unique meter identifier, a timestamp, hourly usage
data, and some kind of time synchronization information.76
The availability of hourly usage data will be a major change for utilities, and it is not yet clear
how this data will be used and distributed to utility subsystems, although they do anticipate using raw
usage data for customer service, billing, and automatic meter activation. Customer service
departments may use usage data and profiles to provide counseling to customers on how to reduce
their bill, and they may also wish to query the meter in real time. In addition, as demand response
pricing systems become more complex and the billing rate changes with time, utility billing
departments may need more detailed data to be able to calculate the bill.77
Although there has been some discussion of a meter that would have sufficient processing and
storage capability to compute a customer’s bill on the customer’s premises, such meters are thought
to be prohibitively expensive and are not currently being planned.78 In the long term, however,
technology is being developed that would place numerous sensors in the home that communicate
wirelessly with a more sophisticated meter. The meter would learn the customer’s preferences and
habits by monitoring and receiving information from sensors dispersed throughout the home,
including occupancy sensors and sensors on power outlets, power cords, or appliances.79 Such inhome systems are being studied by researchers at the University of California-Berkeley.80
In short, rather than containing one data point reflecting average monthly use, customers’ utility
records may soon contain 750 to 3,000 distinct and time-stamped data points per month that reflect
actual energy use. The information about in-home activity that can be determined from this data is
71 The advanced metering pre-deployment and deployment cases filed with the CPUC include: A. 05-03-016 and A. 05-06028 (PG&E), A. 05-03-015 and A. 05-06-017 (SDG&E), and A. 05-03-026 (SCE).
72 California Public Utilities Commission, PUC Approves SmartMeters for PG&E Customers, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION NEWS RELEASE, July 20, 2006, at 1, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/NEWS_RELEASE/58233.pdf; see also
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 2006 Cal. P.U.C. LEXIS 274, at *4 n.2, *96.
73 PUC Approves SmartMeters for PG&E Customers, supra note 72, at 1.
74 A decision in the PG&E rate setting case was issued September 22, 2005. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Decision 05-09-044,
Application 05-03-16, 2005 Cal. P.U.C. LEXIS 438 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sept. 22, 2005). A decision on the SDG&E predeployment filing was issued August 25, 2005. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Decision 05-08-018, Application 05-03-015, 2005
Cal. P.U.C. LEXIS 567 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 25, 2005).
75 NETWORK SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, supra note 1, at 36; PG&E Smart Meter, http://www.pge.com/smartmeter/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2007).
76 Id. at 37.
77 The utilities also anticipate that advanced metering data will be available for monitoring demand load or voltage variation at
transformers, thus allowing customization of transformer size, detection of load imbalance, rerouting, and rebalancing. Utilities
look forward to using advanced metering data for research tasks like load profiling, rate design, and program evaluation, but these
systems will likely not have access to real-time usage data. Some utilities expect to be able to accomplish research tasks using only
subsets or samples of the usage data. Others look forward to data mining the entire set. Since data is not routed to researchers in
real time, there is the ability to preprocess the data that is released.
78 NETWORK SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, supra note 1, at 39; Pacific Gas and Electric Company, PG&E SmartMeter,
http://www.pge.com/smartmeter/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2007).
79 Id. at 40-41; see, e.g., PIER Demand Response Research Center, A National Town Meeting & Symposium on Demand
Response, June 26-27, 2008, http://drrc.lbl.gov/drrc-DRtownmtg-ppt.html.
80 Id.
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radically different from the traditional model. Electricity consumption patterns generated from
advanced metering infrastructure will reveal variations in power consumption that can be associated
with various household activities; detailed power consumption information can reveal personal sleep,
work, and travel habits, and likely identify the use of medical equipment and other specialized devices
(if not ordinary appliances). No longer can utility records be said not to “identify any activities” of a
resident or “provide . . . intimate details of [the suspect’s] life.”81 Unlike in Samson v. Alaska, these
records could likely be used to “reveal discrete information about [the suspect’s] activities.”82
In effect, the data generated by demand response technology is more like infrared sensing
devices than traditional utility records. Like the data provided by the Agema Thermovision 210 at
issue in Kyllo, such data might reveal “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily
sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider ‘intimate’; and a much more sophisticated system
might detect nothing more intimate than the fact that someone left a closet light on.”83 This will be
much more likely, of course, if the sensor-based systems now in development see widespread
implementation. Because the information is held by a private third party, however, and because the
consumer has a contractual relationship with the utility, such information might be considered by
some courts to be nothing more than business records that fall outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, DEMAND RESPONSE, AND THE NEW POWER OF
REMOTE INFORMATION PROCESSING AND STORAGE

¶43

¶44

¶45

As more and more information about individuals’ activities is collected and archived by the
private sector, the Court’s disparate treatment of direct collection of information by the government
versus indirect collection by private sector entities (even where the data collection may be mandated
by law) forces us to confront the possibility of a world with virtually no constitutional protection
constraining government investigation into citizens’ private acts whenever those acts are recorded or
can be inferred from data collected in the private sector. If details of individuals’ in-home activities
are directly recorded in or easily inferred from business records, does the Fourth Amendment simply
have nothing to say about the government’s access and use of this information? Given that
individuals are increasingly dependent on businesses to help them manage activities and events in the
home—including the television they view, the nanny they hire, and the energy they use—will there
be any private activities that remain outside the Fourth-Amendment-free zone created by the
business records case law?
To obtain information lawfully about activity inside a home, law enforcement agents generally
must obtain a warrant or receive permission to “enter” the home, even if “entry” does not entail
setting foot inside the threshold. Private parties wishing to access and use information stored in the
home must subpoena it and obtain a court order requiring production; otherwise, they must trespass
upon private property to obtain it. In all instances, the law provides strong protections against access
to personal information and other items maintained in the home. Any data on personal behavior,
habits, or energy usage that is maintained inside the home is customarily afforded the same high level
of privacy protection against both private party and government intrusions. The individual is able to
exercise the highest level of control over the reuse and disclosure of personal information maintained
inside the home.
In recent years, however, consumer technologies and the networks that connect them have
become more pervasive, sophisticated, and intrusive. Increasingly, such technologies and networks
are making the boundaries of the home porous, as evidenced by devices such as cable set-top boxes
and internet connections, both of which are routinely monitored outside the home by the service
provider. Unlike these services, however, electricity is a necessary component of modern life, and the
Samson, 919 P.2d at 173 (quoting Kluss, 867 P.2d 247).
Id.
83 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
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disclosure of power consumption to a utility company for billing or other limited business purposes
should not relinquish the entirety of an individual’s interest in the privacy of those records, especially
where they contain information that is 750 to 3,000 times more detailed than the data now being
collected. Unlike traditional usage information stored by the utility, this much data allows one to
determine when a person is customarily home and when he or she is away, when a person sleeps,
when a person bathes, the relative number of people in a home, and possibly even which appliances a
person is using—no less than a “virtual current biography” of in-home activity.84
In light of our growing cultural and practical dependence on private sector services that generate
records containing personal information about activities occurring within the home—and particularly
in light of the impending collection of incredibly detailed electricity usage information—by placing
personal information contained in business records outside the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection, the Supreme Court has effectively consigned us to a future without privacy. In Kyllo, the
Court advocated taking “a long view” on the Fourth Amendment,85 finding relevance in the future
potential to intrude on the home rather than the limited heat pattern revealed by the thermal imager
at issue.86 As technology begins to collapse these two doctrines, we propose that the Court take
Kyllo’s “long view” with respect to business records. When confronted with a business record or
other information held by a third party, the Court should ask whether the record, or the technology
used to create the record, reveals information about activities taking place inside the home that
otherwise would not be available absent a trespass into the home. The Court should further inquire
as to whether the consumer has been able to exercise any real choice about whether to create such
records, or whether to maintain such records in the home.87 Because consumers have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in activities that take place inside the home, if the answer to both questions is
yes, then the information should be deemed to fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment,
and law enforcement officials should be required to obtain a warrant before being given access to
those records. Under this test, information about in-home activities generated by advanced meters or
sensors in a demand response system would be protected by the Fourth Amendment. In contrast,
information gleaned from garbage placed on the curb, for example, would not receive such
protection because the user voluntarily released the garbage outside the home.
Unlike Kyllo, we do not recommend that the test depend on whether the government uses the
technology at issue, nor on whether the technology is widely available to the public. The animating
principle in Kyllo is the preservation of privacy in the home in the face of invasive technologies, and
in light of that principle, the increasingly digitized and networked nature of our existence88 should
not vitiate the sanctity of the home and the expectation of privacy that individuals and society
continue to maintain about activities taking place in the home. It is high time for the Court to take a
“long view” on the capacity of business records to intrude on reasonable expectations of privacy in
the home.

Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; see also id. at 36 (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already
in use or in development.”).
86 Id. at 35-36 (rejecting the government’s and dissent’s argument that thermal imagining should be upheld because it detected
only heat radiating from the external surface of the house, instead asserting that “[r]eversing [the approach in Katz] would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the
home . . . the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).
87 From a practical standpoint, such an outcome is likely not possible. Instead, we have proposed a rule that would appeal to a
wide set of stakeholders while protecting particularly problematic records, such as the demand response-generated records, and
placing reasonable limits on the business records doctrine.
88 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005); Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and
Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 83 (2006).
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